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MAKING EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION FAIR AND ACCESSIBLE 
 
 
Theodore J. St. Antoine* 
 
 
Abstract: Mandatory arbitration agreements require employees, as a condition of 
employment, to agree to arbitrate all employment disputes instead of filing court suits. The 
Supreme Court has approved such agreements but many labor experts oppose them. The 
U.S. House of Representatives has passed a bill to prohibit pre-dispute agreements, the 
common form for mandatory arbitrations. This article argues that the House bill would 
have the practical effect of virtually eliminating employment arbitration. Instead, proposals 
are presented for either legislative or judicial steps to ensure that employment arbitration 
is fair and accessible. Requirements would include: (1) voluntary agreements on the part 
of all parties; (2) an arbitrator knowledgeable in the law, jointly selected by the parties; (3) 
a  representative of the employee’s choice; (4) no waiver of class actions; (5) all arbitration 
costs payable by the employer except for a modest filing fee; (6) simple but adequate 
discovery; (7) due process in the hearing, with cross-examination; (8) public law followed 
when applicable; (9) all remedies that are available under law; (10) a written award with 
reasons; (11) limited judicial review; and (12) incorporation of “unconscionability” as an 




The hottest legal issue in employment relations over the last three decades has been 
nonunion employers’ use of so-called “cram-down” or “mandatory” arbitration 
agreements. As a condition of getting or keeping a job, employees have had to agree to 
resolve any employment disputes through an arbitration system established by the 
employer instead of taking their cases to court. That includes statutory claims, even those 
involving civil rights. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,1 the Supreme Court 
approved such contractual arrangements, emphasizing that there was no loss of substantive 
rights but only a change of forum. Gilmer does not prevent the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission from seeking victim-specific relief in court,  
including reinstatement, back pay, and damages.2 But EEOC lacks the resources to pursue 
many meritorious individual cases.3 
 
*James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan. 
 
1 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Gilmer’s decision under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-6 (2018), was reaffirmed in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 
(2001). 
 
2 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).  
 
3 See, e.g., Maurice E.R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 219 (1995).  
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Surveys indicate that employees are subject to mandatory arbitration in over half of 
American workplaces.4 The primary reason for employer resort to arbitration was the 
judicial modification of the traditional American doctrine of “employment at will” in 
almost every state in the country during the 1980s.5 According to that principle, as starkly 
set forth in a classic Nineteenth Century case, employers could lawfully “dismiss their 
employees at will …  for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong.”6 To 
limit this doctrine, courts generally relied on such theories as public policy (a tort)7 and 
implied contract.8 Once the door was open to jury trials, victims of wrongful discharge 
reaped a harvest. Single individuals during that period received jury awards for actual and 
punitive damages as high as $20 million, $4.7 million, $3.25 million, $2.57 million, $2 
million, and $1.5 million.9 For an employer, the fees and expenses even for a successful 
defense of a discharge case before a jury could range between $100,000 and $150,000 in 
major Midwestern cities, and amount to around $200,000 on the coasts.10 Fast, informal, 
and cheaper arbitration was a highly attractive alternative.  
In this article I shall discuss the divergent reactions to mandatory arbitration, the 
merits and defects of the system as it now operates, and the legislative or judicial actions 
that are needed to ensure all parties a fair and accessible arbitral procedure for resolving 
employment disputes. The timeliness of all this is heightened by the passage of the FAIR 
bill11 by the U.S. House of Representatives in September 2019. If enacted, this would 
prohibit all pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate employment disputes and certain other types 
of disputes. The practical effect could be the elimination of most such arbitration.12 
 
4 Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Metastasization of Mandatory Arbitration, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 23 
(2019).  
 
5 9A LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 505:51 (2004) (Louisiana and Rhode Island were the exceptions). 
 
6 Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884). See also HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT at 272-73 (1877).   
 
7 Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (employee refused to join price-fixing 
conspiracy); Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980) (whistleblower); Palmateer v. 
International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981) (whistleblower). 
 
8 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980) (oral commitment to 
employee when hiring); Pugh v. See’s Candies, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (same); Woolley v. 
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (policy statement in personnel manual).  
 
9 Kenneth Lopatka & Julia Martin, Developments in the Law of Wrongful Discharge, in ABA NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE ON LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIMS 
vii, 13-18 (1986).  
 
10 Conversations between author and management attorneys at 1992 midwinter meeting of the ABA Labor 
and Employment Law Section’s Committee on Individual Rights and Responsibilities in the Workplace on 
April 8-9, 1992.  
 
11 FAIR (Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal) bill, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019).  
 





II.CONTRASTING APPRAISALS OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
 
The initial reaction to mandatory arbitration, especially when statutory rights are 
the issue, was generally very hostile. Numerous scholars, two federal agencies, and two 
prestigious private bodies (one was government-sponsored) went on record as opposed to 
mandatory arbitration of statutory employment claims.13 To many critics it seemed an 
outrageous violation of public policy that the price for obtaining a job could be the required 
surrender of access to the judge-and-jury procedure for enforcing statutory rights that was 
established by Congress or a state legislature. The employer as a “repeat player” in 
arbitration was also said to have an advantage over the individual employee, both in 
knowledge about particular arbitrators and in familiarity with the process.14 
A variety of empirical studies present evidence against mandatory arbitration. 
Professors Alexander J.S. Colvin of Cornell and Mark D. Gough of Penn State take the 
lead in this empirical work, either in collaboration or writing separately. Exact findings 
naturally vary from survey to survey. For example, one study saw a win rate of 21.4 percent 
for employees in arbitration versus 36.4 percent in federal court litigation, with median 
damages of $36,500 in arbitration versus $150,500 in federal court.15 Another study found 
a win rate in arbitration of 45 percent against 63 percent in litigation, and median damages 
 
13 See, e.g., Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in 
the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 1  (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory 
Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: the Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENVER U. L. 
REV. 1017 (1996); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and 
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33; EEOC, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Policy, 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) FEP 405:7301-7302, (1997). In July 1997 the EEOC 
issued a longer and even stronger condemnation of compulsory arbitration or pre-dispute agreements to 
arbitrate, declaring that “even the best arbitral systems do not afford the benefits of the judicial system.” 
EEOC, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, 8 
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) FEP 405:7511, 405:7520 (1997). According to the court in Cole v. Burns Int’l 
Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the NLRB General Counsel was apparently prepared at 
one point to issue unfair labor practice complaints on the issue. See also [DUNLOP] COMMISSION ON 
THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEP’TS OF COMMERCE AND 
LABOR, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP 
COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT]; National Academy of Arbitrators, Statement on Condition of 
Employment Agreements, in ARBITRATION 1997: THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS, PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE 50th  ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 312 (Joyce M. Najita 
ed. 1998). Over time the NAA has softened its opposition, with its most recent resolution stating that 
“voluntary arbitration is always preferable,”and “it is desirable for employees to be allowed to opt freely, 
post-dispute, for either the courts and administrative tribunals or arbitration.” See National Academy of 
Arbitrators, Policy Statement on Employment Arbitration (May 20, 2009), https://naarb.org/employment-
arbitration-policy-and-guidelines/. 
 
14 Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 
(1997); Alexander J.D. Colvin & Mark D. Gough, The Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in the 
United States: Actors and Outcomes, 68 ILR Rev.-J. Work & Pol’y 1019, 1023-25 (2015). 
 
15 Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 




of $187,000 in arbitration against $225,000 in litigation.16 Professor Colvin sums up this 
negative case by asserting that “mandatory arbitration exacerbates inequality in access to 
justice in the workplace.”17 A subhead for the opening article in a series denouncing 
arbitration in The New York Times puts it even more sharply: “Vast Trend Locks Americans 
Out of Court – Rulings Greatly Favor Business.”18  
As I have argued more extensively elsewhere,19 there is still something to be said 
on behalf of mandatory arbitration, even in its flawed current state. Different empirical 
studies provide a different perspective from those mentioned earlier. Perhaps most 
significant is the matter of accessibility. In comparing arbitration and court suits, Professor 
Christopher Drahozal of the University of Kansas concluded: “The empirical evidence 
suggests that arbitration may be a more accessible forum than courts for lower income 
employees and consumers with small claims.”20 Another survey of American Arbitration 
Association (AAA) cases found, as of the early 2000s, that employees having an annual 
income less than $60,000 (or an equivalent claim) generally could not bear the cost of court 
litigation, but arbitration remained a viable option. 21  Lewis Maltby, President of the 
National Workrights Institute, has been opposed in principle to mandatory arbitration. Yet 
in light of the available data he concluded that twice as many employees could afford to go 
to arbitration as could afford court suits.22 
It is undeniable that winning plaintiffs in court suits generally receive more than 
winning parties in arbitration.23 But that calls for a whole set of cautionary words. First, 
 
16 Mark D. Gough, The High Costs of an Inexpensive Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Employment 
Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and Civil Litigation, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 105 
(2014). 
 
17 Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 71 (2014). 
 
18 Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking Deck of Justice, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2016, at A1.  
 
19 E.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks,  
41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 783 (2008).  
 
20 Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J. 
L. REFORM 813, 840 (2008). 
 
21 Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, 58 DISP. RES. J., May-Jul. 
2003, at 8, 10-11. See also Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment 
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RES. J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004, at 44.  
 
22 Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F.L. REV. 105, 117  (2003). 
In 2015 Maltby surveyed two leading plaintiffs’ law firms. Of 301 employees seeking representation who 
had seemingly valid claims, 112 (37%) were rejected because their damages were inadequate or they could 
not pay counsel fees. The 112 were asked about later developments. Of the 26 who responded, 16 (62%) 
were unable to get other counsel. Maltby declared: “A significant number of people with legitimate cases 
are denied access to justice because their cases do not have high enough damages to interest the private 
bar.” (Reports are on file with the author.)  
 
23 See supra notes 15 and 16 and articles cited.   
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from what has just been seen, it is the plaintiffs with the larger claims who are able to get 
into court, and so larger judgments should naturally follow, without casting any discredit 
on arbitration. Second, the assumption seems to be that the larger recovery is the superior, 
fairer recovery. That may not be true in any given case. Employers too have rights. The 
judgment of an experienced, professional decision-maker may well be sounder on occasion 
than that of an emotionally aroused lay jury. Third, while the “repeat player” phenomenon 
is often said to show that arbitrators are favoring employers in order to ensure future 
business, a more innocent explanation exists. Employers are not uneducable, and over time 
they learn what discipline arbitrators will sustain. An old arbitrator adage, instilled by the 
veterans into newcomers, is also apropos: “Decide every case as if it’s the last case you are 
ever going to decide.” Fourth, in looking at comparative figures, evaluators usually focus 
only on cases going to a final decision, paying no heed to summary dismissals. The latter 
are common in court cases but rare in arbitrations. Counting summary dismissals would 
lower the median recovery disproportionately more in court litigation than in arbitration.    
Fifth, there is a comparison that I think could be even more relevant than court litigation, 
and that is comparing nonunion employment arbitration with collectively bargained labor 
arbitration. For about a decade I served on a panel of arbitrators for U.S. Steel and the 
United Steelworkers. This could be regarded as a “gold standard” for arbitration, with 
“repeat players” of the highest quality on both sides and with nationally recognized 
arbitrators deciding the cases. I studied the 200 discharge cases last handled by these 
arbitrators before I resigned from the panel because of the press of other duties. The union 
won, in the sense of getting some relief for the terminated employees, in only 23 percent 
of the cases. That puts a different light on the employee win rates of 21.4 percent and 45 
percent in the major studies of nonunion employment arbitrations cited earlier.24 Professors 
David Sherwyn and Michael Heise of Cornell University and Samuel Estreicher of New 
York University concluded from the various empirical studies they examined that “there is 
no evidence that plaintiffs fare significantly better in litigation [than in arbitration].”25  
Finally, another critical factor should be taken into account. While I was a part-time 
labor (union-management) arbitrator for fifty years, I served in only about half a dozen 
nonunion employment cases. With the exception of one case referred to me by a court, the 
primary basis for the employees’ claims in all those cases was contractual, usually 
stemming from a personnel manual “just cause” provision, and not statutory.  Although 
“[a]round half” of the AAA cases in one of Professor Colvin’s studies were said to involve 
employment discrimination claims,26 another AAA study by Cornell Professor Theodore 
Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill found that only 19.5 percent dealt with statutory civil rights 
claims.27 At issue in most cases were individual contracts or personnel manuals. Two 
important points should be noted. First, most cases in these arbitrations were not concerned 
with statutory rights, which have been the major focus of opponents of mandatory 
 
24 See Colvin, supra note 15; Gough, supra note 16. 
 
25 David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A 
New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN L. REV. 1557, 1578 (2005). 
 
26 Colvin, supra note 17, at 80. 
 
27 Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 21, at 49. 
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arbitration. Second, and perhaps of even more practical significance, the substantial 
majority of these cases apparently involved new contractual rights, ordinarily based on 
personnel manuals. Along with imposing mandatory arbitration, the employers had 
simultaneously provided “just cause” substantive contract rights for their workers that 
previously did not apply. Of course this linkage with arbitration is not legally required, but 
it is very common and it is often a job saver for employees.  
I do not intend a blanket endorsement of mandatory employment arbitration as it 
now exists. There are deficiencies and they should be remedied. But it is most important to 
recognize that even the current system frequently benefits employees, especially the lower 
income rank-and-file workers who cannot find lawyers to take their cases to court.28 We 
do not want to wind up with a “cure” that is worse than the current ills. I now turn to a 
discussion of appropriate measures for improving employment arbitration.   
 
III. ELIMINATION OR IMPROVEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION? 
 
As mentioned earlier,29 the Democratic-controlled U.S. House of Representatives 
has already passed the so-called FAIR bill by a vote of 225 to 186.30  Section 2(a) would 
“prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements that force arbitration of future employment, 
consumer, antitrust, or civil rights disputes.” An agreement to arbitrate that is negotiated 
after a dispute has arisen is undoubtedly fairer to all parties than a pre-dispute agreement. 
A post-dispute agreement is more likely to be truly voluntary because the facts and legal 
issues are now mostly known, and the parties can make an informed judgment about the 
relative merits of an arbitration instead of a court action. Furthermore, if an employee has 
been discharged, the worker need not worry much about offending the employer, as might 
be true in rejecting the employer’s offer of arbitration at the time of hiring.   
All that makes good sense, theoretically. There is a practical obstacle. Post-dispute 
arbitration agreements are much harder to obtain. If employees have a large potential 
monetary claim, they and their lawyers will want to get the case before the supposedly 
more sympathetic jury.31 On the other hand, if the claim is relatively small, the employer 
will wait it out, assuming the employee will not be able to find a lawyer to bring suit. Thus, 
management representatives testified before the Dunlop Commission that employers 
would generally not be willing to enter into post-dispute agreements to arbitrate. 32 
Experience bears this out. The vast majority of reported employment arbitration cases are 
 
28 Cf. Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration 
for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 418-64 (2000). 
 
29 See Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 
30See 165 CONG. REC. H7848-H7852 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2019). 
 
31 See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1265 
(2009). 
 
32 See U.S. DEP’T OF COMM. AND LABOR, REP. ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT REL. 118 (1994); see 
also Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: The Feasibility of Post-Dispute Employment 




based on pre-dispute agreements. To outlaw such agreements is in effect to terminate 
nearly all employment arbitration. For me the person most in need of protection here is the 
rank-and-file worker with a relatively modest monetary claim, like a dischargee seeking 
only reinstatement and back pay. Such employees can seldom secure good legal 
representation. They are able to invoke the rather informal process of arbitration pro se, on 
their own, or with a friend, or even with a less experienced lawyer charging lower fees. I 
have personally seen this occur, and it can work. My objective, then, is to see how best to 
remedy the defects of employment arbitration, not destroy it.  
 
IV.ENSURING A FAIR EMPLOYMENT ABITRATION SYSTEM 
 
A. General Principles 
 
1. Legal Developments 
 
            Initially it appeared that the courts would be prepared to oversee the fairness of 
employer-promulgated arbitration systems by applying standards of public policy and 
unconscionability. Thus the D.C. Circuit in Cole v. Burns International Security Services33 
looked to Gilmer’s34 requirements for “effectively … vindicat[ing]” statutory rights. Cole 
concluded an arbitration procedure could be sustained when it: (1) provides for neutral 
arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) 
provides for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) 
does not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or 
expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum.35 
             Professor Martin Malin of Chicago-Kent College of Law was one of the 
disinterested observers who felt that decisions like Cole meant the courts would play a 
“strict judicial policing” role and apply “bright-line” rules in reviewing the fairness of 
employment arbitration systems.36 But the U.S. Supreme Court’s next steps dashed those 
hopes. 37 
             In effect the Court used a three-pronged approach under the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA)38 to stymie judicial oversight of arbitration.  First, in a series of cases beginning 
 
33 See Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (2-1 decision). 
 
34 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.  
 
35 See 105 F.3d at 1482. 
 
36 Martin H. Malin, Due Process in Employment Arbitration: The State of the Law and the Need for Self-
Regulation, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 363, 366-67 (2007); see also Richard A. Bales, Beyond the 
Protocol: Recent Trends in Employment Arbitration, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 301 (2007). 
 
37 See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All or 
Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L. J. 289, 302-11 (2012). 
 
38 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2018); see also Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124 (2001) (The FAA 




with Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph,39 the Court generally made the question of 
whether arbitral procedures impair a claimant’s effective vindication of statutory rights an 
issue for the arbitrator and not the court. These particular cases involved commercial and 
not employment claims but the Court’s reasoning would certainly seem to apply to 
employees’ cases.  
          A second step was to make the FAA preemptive of a state’s law regarding 
unconscionability. The leading case, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 40  involved 
another commercial claim. Cell phone customers brought a class action in federal court to 
prevent an allegedly fraudulent sales tax charge of $30. The company moved to compel 
arbitration, although its mandatory arbitration agreement prohibited class actions. Lower 
courts denied the motion for arbitration on the grounds that prevention of class actions in 
these circumstances was unconscionable under California law. Pursuing $30 claims was 
financially unfeasible without grouping them. Section 2 of the FAA makes arbitration 
agreements valid and enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.”41 California would apply the rule against class action 
waivers to any contract involving small monetary claims, not just arbitration agreements.42 
Despite that, the Supreme Court held (5-4) that the FAA preempted the state law because 
of “the overarching purpose of the FAA,” described as “the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”43 
Finally, a third step was to prefer the FAA even against the competing provisions of federal 
statutes, including labor and employment law. In D.R. Horton, Inc.,44 and Murphy Oil USA, 
Inc.,45 a divided National Labor Relations Board sought to distinguish employment cases 
 
39 Randolph seemed to assume courts had the authority to decide the question presented, but the subsequent 
decisions clearly appear to designate the arbitrator as the authority in the usual case. See Green Tree Fin. 
Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000) (objecting party has burden of showing likelihood that 
arbitration would be prohibitively expensive); see also PacificCare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406 
(2001) (arbitration enforceable even though agreement precluded “punitive” damages and claim was under 
federal statute authorizing treble damages; arbitrator must resolve “ambiguity”); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. 
Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 454 (2003) (silence of arbitration agreement on permissibility of class actions left the 
question for arbitrator rather than court); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 
(2006) (validity under state law of contract containing arbitration clause was issue for arbitrator). 
 
40 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011). 
 
41 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).  
 
42 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 113 P. 3d 1100, 1117 (2005). 
 
43 AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 344, 352. 
  
44 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2293 (2012), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 737 F.3d 344, 364 
(5th Cir. 2013). 
 





from commercial cases46 regarding class-action waivers. The Board held (3-2 in Murphy) 
that employees’ right under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act47 to engage in 
“concerted activities” included the right to file group or class actions in arbitration. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court resolved a split in the circuits by deciding, in Epic Systems 
Corp. v. Lewis,48 that the NLRA did not clearly manifest an intent to displace the FAA and 
outlaw waivers of class actions in arbitration. Justice Gorsuch declared for the majority: 
“This Court has never read a right to class actions into the NLRA—and for three quarters 
of a century neither did the National Labor Relations Board.”49 Justice Ginsburg dissented, 
joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.50  
           In my view, there should be a federal theory of unconscionability under the FAA, 
prohibiting the waiver of class actions, which are often the only practical way of 
vindicating some vital substantive rights through arbitration. According to an esteemed 
authority, the doctrine of unconscionability has “deep roots both in law and equity.”51 As 
the accepted grounds for not enforcing unfair contracts, unconscionability is now a 
pervasive and almost universally accepted legal concept. It ought to be a central feature of 
both federal and state arbitration law.  
 
2.          Existing Nonlegal Standards  
 
           Three different groups have promulgated rather similar procedural standards for 
protecting employees’ rights in employment arbitration. They are the so-called Dunlop 
Commission;52 the Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, which 
drafted the widely adopted but somewhat outdated Employment Due Process Protocol;53 
 
46 In addition to cases already discussed, see Am. Express Corp. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 
(2013) (federal antitrust claim; 5-3 decision). Justice Sotomayor did not participate.  
 
47 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018). 
 
48 138 S. Ct. 1612 (U.S. 2018).  
 
49 Id. at 1619. 
 
50 Id. at 1633.  
 
51 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.2 (Joseph M. Perillo rev. ed. 2002). See also Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Congress adopted the Uniform Commercial 
Code with its § 2-302 on unconscionability for the District of Columbia); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 234 (AM. L.  INST. 1981). 
 
52 DUNLOP COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, supra note 13. 
 
53 TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, A DUE 
PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES 
ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995), 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Employment%20Due%20Process%20Protocol
_0.pdf (hereinafter DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL). The Task Force consisted of management, union, and 
plaintiffs’ attorneys from the American Bar Association and the National Employment Lawyers 
Association, and representatives of the American Arbitration Association, the American Civil Liberties 
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and the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA), which produced two separate sets of 
Guidelines.54 If the courts will not or cannot adopt such protections, Congress should 
amend the FAA to provide them. A composite of the basic rights set forth in these various 
formulations, with some emendations by me that are duly noted, would include the 
following:  
A.     As a matter of principle, critics are correct that arbitration should be the 
voluntary choice of both parties at any time, pre-dispute or post-dispute, especially 
when statutory rights are at stake.55 But when an employer has provided, through a 
personnel manual or otherwise, that there will be no discharge or discipline except 
for “just cause,” I personally would allow the employer to require arbitration as the 
means of enforcing those new and highly valuable contractual rights. 
B.     The arbitrator must be a neutral person who knows the law and is jointly 
selected by the parties. The arbitrator must make written disclosure of all personal, 
social, professional, financial, or other interests that might raise reasonable doubts 
about the arbitrator’s independence or impartiality. Conflicts of interest cannot be 
waived even with the knowing consent of all parties. 
C.      Class actions or group grievances must be available and cannot be waived 
when they are necessary to effectively vindicate employees’ rights. 
D.     The arbitrator has the initial responsibility for ensuring that all parties are 
accorded due process. That includes seeing that the arbitrator is not selected by one 
party or from a panel created by one party.56 
E.        The parties are entitled to representation by a person of their choice, attorney 
or otherwise.  
F.    There must be simple, adequate discovery, as needed for a full and fair 
exploration of the issues in dispute, but consistent with the expedited nature of 
arbitration.  
 
Union, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the National Academy of Arbitrators, and the 
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution.  
 
54 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, GUIDELINES FOR EMPLOYMENT 
ARBITRATION, https://naarb.org/employment-arbitration-policy-and-guidelines/; NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, GUIDELINES FOR STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS IN MANDATORY EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION, 
https://naarb.org/guidelines-for-standards-of-professional-responsibility-in-mandatory-employment-
arbitration/. See generally Barry Winograd, Developing Standards of Professional Responsibility for 
Arbitrators in Mandatory Employment Arbitration Proceedings, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 61 
(2014). The Academy Guidelines are precatory, not binding and enforceable. There is also a CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES, 
https://naarb.org/code-of-professional-responsibility/, jointly administered by the Academy, the American 
Arbitration Association, and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The Code is legally binding 
on arbitrators in the unionized context. Amendments to the Code would appear to make it equally 
applicable to employment arbitrators (see the Code’s “Foreword” and “Preamble – Background, Scope of 
Code”) but that has not been officially established by the three administering parties. 
 
55 See supra note 13, and authorities cited. 
 
56 See, e.g., McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 487 (6th Cir. 2004). Cf. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. 




G.       Arbitrators must make a reasonable effort to address and follow public law 
whenever public law is at issue in a case. I personally would let the parties narrow 
the issues in arbitration and insist that the arbitrator stick to interpreting and 
applying the contract. The parties could then have a court deal with any statutory 
issues, if necessary. Increasingly, however, especially in public-sector cases and 
certainly in federal cases, it is generally assumed that the arbitrator will apply public 
law.  
H.       All remedies provided by public law must be available in the arbitration of 
the same substantive rights. 
            I.         There must be a written arbitration opinion and award, with reasons. 
            J.         Judicial review should be limited, concentrating on the law.  
 
B. Applying New Legal Standards 
 
Some elaboration is appropriate concerning the proposed new legal standards set 




As I have acknowledged,57 post-dispute agreements are best calculated to ensure a 
genuinely voluntary acceptance of arbitration by employees. Yet I have ruled out that 
facially attractive option because it means the virtual elimination of arbitration, the most 
feasible resort for the lower-income worker with a small monetary claim.  There are 
nonetheless viable ways to increase the likelihood that an employee’s agreeing to 
arbitration will be knowing and voluntary. Employers now are explicitly forbidden to 
inquire about an applicant’s disability before making a conditional job offer, and pre-hire 
inquiries about race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age may be evidence of 
unlawful discrimination in the absence of a justifiable business purpose. 58  Similarly, 
Congress could prohibit any pre-employment offers of arbitration. Arbitration could only 
be proposed once the employee was on the job. A further assurance of voluntariness would 
be a statutory requirement that employees have some stipulated period of time, perhaps a 
week, to consider the offer. That would enable a worker to consult some more experienced 
person, or even an attorney, about the advisability of agreeing to arbitrate all employment 
disputes. Finally, the FAA could expressly forbid an employer to retaliate because of an 
employee’s refusal to arbitrate. 
I still believe there is a practical case to be made, on an analysis of the real-world 
pros and cons, for allowing employers to impose mandatory arbitration, so long as essential 
procedural safeguards are maintained.59 But if the Democrats win the Senate (and retain 
the House), the well-intentioned but misguided impetus will be so strong for outlawing all 
 
57 See supra text accompanying note 29.  
 
58 See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices, 
https://www.eeoc.gov//laws/practices/. 
  




pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate that the most sensible compromise course would seem 
to be the voluntary approach outlined above.  
 
2. Arbitrator Selection 
 
Professor Malin rightly declares: “The enormous importance of the identity and 
impartiality of the arbitrator appointing agency is obvious.”60 This assumes that an outside 
designating agency like the American Arbitration Association or JAMS, rather than a panel 
created by the employer, will be required by law. There is much to commend that procedure 
and a number of disinterested experts support it. But I would at least raise the question of 
whether the parties, in order to save time and administrative costs, should be allowed to 
compile their own list of candidates for appointment. The employer would undoubtedly 
take the lead in this but I would append three conditions: (1) the employer’s candidates 
would have to be established arbitrators, such as members of the National Academy of 
Arbitrators or persons on a reputable designating agency’s panel; (2) the employee could 
add candidates to the list; and (3) the employee would be entitled ultimately to resort to an 
outside panel if dissatisfied with the internal options. Ordinarily it is the employee who is 
most concerned about getting a timely decision in arbitration, and that factor should impel 
the employee to give reasonable consideration to the internal panel before going outside.  
Use of an outside designating agency does not automatically guarantee fairness to the 
parties in any given arbitration. The standards applied by the agency in accepting persons 
onto its roster of arbitrators are naturally important, but most important are the criteria 
employed in selecting the panel of candidates offered the parties in a particular dispute. 
The agency can tailor the type of arbitrators listed on the basis of its knowledge of the 
parties involved, or in response to the stipulated requests of the parties themselves. The 
law should make clear that any “tailoring” in an employment arbitration case must be 
entirely neutral and responsive only to the joint request of both employer and employee. 
Special attention should be paid to full disclosure about proposed arbitrators, especially 
their repeated handling of cases with the current employer or similar employers.  
 
3. Costs of Arbitration 
 
Heeding the maxim that “the person who pays the piper calls the tune,” the widely 
adopted Due Process Protocol sought to ensure arbitrator impartiality by requiring 
employers and employees to share the arbitrator’s fees and expenses.61 But the D.C Circuit 
in its Cole decision,62 speaking through Chief Judge Harry Edwards, himself a former labor 
arbitrator, doubted that arbitrators cared who paid their fees as long as they were paid. 
Instead, the court of appeals took the more realistic position that imposing costly arbitration 
fees (now in the range of $1,000-$2,500 per day) on employees could block their access to 
 
60 Id. at 312.  
 
61 See DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 53.  
 




arbitration and should thus be invalid.63 Section 2.A.4 of the latest set of Guidelines of the 
National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA), applicable to mandatory arbitrations, declares 
simply: “One party may be made solely responsible for arbitrator fees pursuant to 
applicable law, agency rules, or agreement of the parties.”64 In the absence of dealings 
between parties of equivalent bargaining power (the TV anchor, the company CEO), that 
“one party” has to be the employer.  
As a practical matter, the cost of employment arbitration has not been a major 
problem for most employees. Employers have generally borne the total expense of the 
arbitration proceedings, though usually not the employee’s attorney fees or other 
representational costs. To guard against frivolous claims, however, it would seem entirely 
fair to impose a modest filing fee on employees, not to exceed the amount of the filing fee 
for a civil action in the relevant federal district court.  
 
4. Class Actions 
 
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court relied on the Federal Arbitration Act to 
overturn rulings under state law and the National Labor Relations Act that would have 
prohibited contractual waivers of class actions in both consumer65  and employment66 
arbitrations. In AT&T Mobility, the consumer case, Justice Scalia for the 5-4 majority 
criticized class actions in arbitration as overly formal, slower, costlier, and riskier for 
defendants.67 He concluded: “Arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class 
litigation.”68 Professor Malin agrees that “[c]lass actions do not belong in arbitration,” 
primarily on the ground there is no cure for the appearance of bias on the part of an  
arbitrator who has been chosen by the named claimants and the respondent.69 Absent  class 
members may have legitimate objections to the positions of the named claimants. These 
are genuine concerns but I believe they are outweighed by other considerations.  
If one sets aside individual discipline and discharge cases, a very substantial 
percentage of collectively bargained or labor arbitrations have always been based on group 
claims or so-called “policy” grievances. They can relate to such important matters as pay 
rates, job classifications and assignments, overtime, seniority, vacations, safety and health, 
and so on. These issues may sometimes raise divisions or create factions within the 
workforce. Part of the union’s responsibility is to reconcile these differences to present a 
united front against the employer in an arbitration. True, in this institutional setting, the 
 
63 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  
 
64 See supra note 54.  
 
65 See AT&T Mobility, supra note 40.  
 
66 See Epic Systems Corp., supra note 48.  
 
67 AT&T Mobility, supra note 40, at 344-51.  
 
68 Id. at 350.  
 




union is subject to the legal obligation of fair representation of all members of the “class” 
in the bargaining unit. 70  But the alternative to arbitral class actions in the nonunion 
workplace is to leave most small individual claims totally without remedy. Professor Malin 
is worried about the “appearance” of arbitrator bias in these cases. I have enough 
confidence in the integrity of established arbitrators that I would accept that risk. At the 
worst the risk of bias in some few cases is better than a waiver and loss of recourse in all 
cases. And in many if not most of these class actions there is no problem anyway. The 
interests of the named claimants and of the rest of the class are identical. They all want the 
same pay raise or retirement benefit.  
Finally, consideration should be given to imposing a statutory duty of fair 
representation on the named claimants in nonunion arbitrations. This would be analogous 
to the duty of fair representation borne by unions under the National Labor Relations Act 
and the Railway Labor Act. 71  That duty as applied by the courts and administrative 
agencies has generally proved to be flexible and effective. I see no reason why it could not 
be a feasible safeguard in the nonunion class action context as well.   
Some employers are discovering that it is not all to their advantage to have 
foreclosed class actions in arbitration by extracting waivers from employees. There are 
now reports that some savvy plaintiffs’ lawyers have filed a host of claims in a veritable 
fusillade of separate arbitrations against the same employer, raising the specter of huge 
defense costs.72  
 
5. Shortening Limitations Periods 
 
As I have discussed elsewhere,73  the courts have taken at least three different 
positions on whether the parties can agree to shorten the relevant statutory period for filing 
a claim in arbitration. The issue does not yet appear to be resolved. In workplace disputes, 
there are good, practical reasons for allowing a waiver and not letting a dispute fester, 
especially when a watchful, knowledgeable union is involved. In the nonunion situation, 
however, I would take the position that if a statutory substantive right is at issue, the 
statutory limitations period should prevail. But if the claim concerns a contractual matter, 
I would permit the parties to set a shorter time for filing than the statutory limitation on 
contract actions, as long as the parties’ period is reasonable.  
   
6. Choice of Representative 
 
 
70 See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (Railway Labor Act); Vaca v. 
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (National Labor Relations Act); Archibald Cox, The Duty of Fair 




72 See, e.g., Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, ‘Scared to Death’ by Arbitration: Companies 
Drowning in Their Own System, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2020, at B1 (nytimes.com).  
 




Any compendium of worker rights will include a provision that employees are 
entitled to their free choice of the persons to represent them in dealings with their employer. 
In arbitration that is often an attorney but not necessarily so. It may be a friend or a fellow 
worker. Any statute should be explicit that nonunion employees may also be represented 
in arbitrations by an organization, including a labor organization.74 The latter is not a 
common practice in the United States, but trade unions in the United Kingdom have used 
it as a recruitment and organizing tactic, demonstrating forcefully the advantages of union 
representation for workers in a dispute with their employer. On occasion the American 
Federation of Government Employees and other public-sector unions have represented 
nonunion employees in arbitration.75 Moreover, it is well known that even if unrepresented 
employees are reinstated in arbitration, they seldom remain employed for long. There are 
subtle ways to displace unwanted workers. They could use the strength of an organization 
behind them.  
If employees in an arbitration are “pro se,” or representing themselves, Section 
2.A.5.a of the NAA Standards applicable to mandatory arbitrations states:  
The arbitrator must inform unrepresented parties that the arbitrator is not representing 
either party…. While the arbitrator may not assist either party in the presentation of its 
case, the arbitrator may explain the arbitration process to an unrepresented party.76 
That is a delicate balance to maintain. Arbitrators must exercise extreme caution to be fair 
to both parties while recognizing the considerable handicap under which the pro se 




Discovery is a special problem in nonunion employment arbitrations. In the usual 
collectively bargained arbitration, the established union starts with a close working 
knowledge of the employer’s structure, management, operations, and past practices. Then 
there is a prescribed multi-step grievance procedure preceding the arbitration in which a 
wide array of facts can be secured. None of this obtains in most employment arbitrations.  
Colleagues who do much more employment arbitration than I tell me that handling 
prehearing discovery may be the single most significant – and difficult – procedural 
function they perform. The strong-minded say they must simply “take charge.” After 
hearing out the parties on their desires and objections, these arbitrators “lay down the law.” 
The objective is to elicit the necessary facts, especially for the uninformed employee, but 
without unduly burdening the employer with excessive inquiries or overwhelming the 
employee with a mountain of indecipherable data. And all this must be done within a 
reasonable period of time. To accomplish that, the arbitrators often spell out exactly the 
number and time limits on depositions and interrogatories, including even the maximum 
 
74 See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, Trilogy Redux: Using Arbitration to Rebuild the Labor Movement, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 1682, 1683n. 4 and authorities cited (2014). 
 
75 See, e.g., Joseph E. Slater, The Assault on Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Real Harms and 
Imaginary Benefits, 5 ADVANCE [J. AM. CONST. SOC.] 58 (2011).  
 
76 See supra note 54. Under § 10(a)(2) of the Federal Arbitration Act, a federal court may vacate an arbitral 
award if there was “evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2018).  
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number of questions to be asked. Legislation or judicial rulings should allow arbitrators 
much latitude in supervising discovery. 
 
8. Due Process 
 
Section 10(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act authorizes a federal court to vacate an 
arbitral award if there was a refusal to hear “pertinent and material” evidence or “any other 
misbehavior” prejudicing a party’s rights.77 That certainly should include such acts as a 
denial of appropriate cross-examination during the hearing. How about unduly rushing the 
proceedings so the arbitrator can catch an early plane? “Misbehavior” may connote rather 
serious misconduct, and more innocent denials of parties’ rights can occur. Statutes cannot 
be expected to delineate all aspects of fair procedure. Indeed, too much specification could 
lead to unintended exclusions by overly literal courts in interpreting and applying the law. 
Nonetheless, it would be well to include an express reference in the FAA to such broad and 
well-recognized legal standards as “due process” and “unconscionability.” 
Unconscionability should be unacceptable not only in the parties’ agreement but also in an 
arbitrator’s performance under it. 
 
9. Opinions and Awards 
 
In considering an award in a collectively bargained arbitration, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has stated: “Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an 
award.”78 Nevertheless, all three of the prestigious private groups cited earlier who have 
dealt with this question in the context of nonunion employment arbitration have called for 
a written opinion setting forth the rationale for the award.79 That is necessary and desirable 
both to inform the parties exactly why a particular decision was reached,  which can be 
critical in securing mutual acceptance of the result, and to enable any reviewing court to 
determine the fairness and validity of the award itself. 
  Section 2.J.2.a of the National Academy of Arbitrators’ Guidelines for mandatory 
arbitrations introduces an innovative requirement: “If the arbitrator concludes the case 
should be decided on the basis of a rationale or position not presented or argued by any 
party, the arbitrator must first give all parties an opportunity to respond.”80 Courts of course 
frequently wind up adopting their own novel theory that neither party espoused, much to 
the dismay of even experienced attorneys. Yet one can see how this practice  could be 
especially hurtful in an arbitration, particularly for the pro se claimant who might have 
failed to articulate initially a wholly legitimate position that, once spelled out, would have 
led the arbitrator to go in a quite different direction. The NAA’s provision is the sort of 
detail that one would hesitate to include in a statute, but it could be a sound cautionary 
 
77 Id. § 10(a).  
 
78 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).  
 
79 See supra notes 13, 53, and 54 and authorities cited.  
 




word for arbitrators. In an extreme case – a unilateral arbitral rationale leagues distant from 
either party’s position or arguments – a reviewing court might well conclude there was a 
denial of due process.  
 
10. Arbitrator’s Post-Award Conduct 
 
It may also be unnecessary for a statute to deal with an arbitrator’s post-award 
conduct but certain actions should be out of bounds in any event. Both the Code of 
Professional Responsibility,81 applicable to labor arbitration and I believe applicable to 
employment arbitration as well, and the NAA Guidelines82 for mandatory arbitrations 
prohibit an arbitrator from clarifying or interpreting an issued award without the consent 
of all parties. Each of these sets of rules has an exception. An arbitrator may retain remedial 
jurisdiction for the specific purpose of resolving any disputes that may arise concerning 
the interpretation or implementation of the remedy provided by the award.  
A couple of other restrictions imposed by these private regulations would seem 
natural but hardly worth legislative attention. An arbitrator is forbidden to have an opinion 
and award published without the advance approval of the parties. And arbitrators may not 
voluntarily participate in legal proceedings to enforce an award. But that would not prevent 
an arbitrator from responding to a valid subpoena.  
 
11. Judicial Review  
 
The variegated groups of experts who produced the Dunlop Commission Report 
and the Due Process Protocol are in accord that judicial review of arbitration awards should 
be limited, primarily concentrating on matters of law rather than the arbitrator’s contractual 
interpretations or findings of fact.83 In Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine 
Workers District 17, 84 the Supreme Court stated: “[W]e must treat the arbitrator’s award 
as if it represented an agreement between Eastern and the union as to the proper meaning 
of the contract’s words….” In effect, absent fraud or an exceeding of authority under the 
parties’ submission, the notion of an “arbitrator’s misinterpretation” of a contract is a 
contradiction in terms. The parties to an arbitration almost invariably agree that the award 
shall be “final and binding,” and their stipulation should be honored. Of course, if the 
parties’ contract itself, or the arbitral award implementing it, calls for the performance of 
actions that are contrary to law or “explicit, well-defined” public policy, then the award 
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The proposal to ban pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate is understandable because  
at that stage the job applicant or employee is the most vulnerable, under the most pressure 
to accept the employer’s offer. In addition, a more informed and voluntary decision is most 
likely after the issue arises and the facts are known. But then comes the reality check. If 
the monetary claim is substantial, the employee will want to get before a jury. If the claim 
is modest, the employer will believe the employee probably cannot find a lawyer to go to 
court and can safely be left remediless. And thus the most likely time for both parties to 
agree on arbitration is when neither knows what the future holds, before the dispute occurs. 
Insisting solely on post-dispute agreements could be the death-knell for most private 
employment arbitration.  
 I myself do not consider so-called mandatory arbitration – that is, when agreement 
to arbitrate is made a condition of employment – all that bad, as long as all due process 
safeguards are provided.86 But I also believe that the opponents of mandatory arbitration 
are so adamant that if Democratic majorities prevail in both houses of Congress, the 
political realities probably require an acceptance of voluntarism as a fundamental standard. 
As discussed above, 87  there are ways for the FAA to ensure a voluntary employee 
agreement to arbitrate even in a pre-dispute situation. These could include an express 
statutory prohibition of an employer’s retaliation against an employee for refusing to 
arbitrate.   
The FAA should also be amended to authorize class actions in arbitration, and to 
prohibit their waiver, at least when that is necessary for the effective vindication of 
employees’ statutory or contractual rights. It is always possible that there will be 
differences in the positions of the named claimants and absent members of the class. A 
duty of fair representation could be imposed on the named members. And a capable, 
reputable arbitrator should be able to sort out those differences – or find that the differences 
are so substantial that the various claimants belong in separate classes.  
Lastly, the FAA should expressly adopt the vital, pervasive principle of 
unconscionability as an element of federal law.88 One of the worst failures of the current 
Supreme Court was to deny the applicability of state law on unconscionability in deference 
to the supposedly superior preemptive authority of the existing FAA.89 The doctrine of 
unconscionability should apply to the agreement to arbitrate, to the conduct of the parties 
throughout, and to the handling of the arbitration proceedings by the arbitrator. That would 
be a highly important and salutary development in both substantive and procedural federal 
law. 
 
552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008), quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). See generally Stephen J. 
Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 56 (2014). 
 
86 See St. Antoine, supra note 19.  
 
87 See supra text at note 55.   
 
88 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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